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The Asia-Pacific War and the Failed Second Anglo-Japanese Civilian Exchange, 1942-45 アジア太平洋戦争と実現しなかった第二
次英日残留民間人の交換
Rowena Ward
The proposed 2nd Anglo-Japanese civilian exchange, originally planned for October 1942, never eventuated partly due to differences in the interpretations of
what constitutes a merchant seaman and views on whether the Hague Convention should apply. The failure of the exchange meant that over 3,000 Japanese
and British civilian internees as well as another 2,000 or so Japanese and American civilian internees remained in internment camps until at least August
1945. At the heart of the negotiations were 331 Japanese pilots and pearl divers who had been employed in the pearling industry until the outbreak of war. The
impasse would impact attempts at civilian exchange involving multiple powers throughout the Asia-Pacific War.
Keywords: civilian internment; Japanese; Australia; exchange
The outbreak of military conflict inevitably finds civilians living in what has become enemy territory. During both world wars, civilians were detained by the
enemy and held in internment camps. During the Second World War, Japanese civilians were interned in camps in, among other countries, New Zealand,
Australia, India, Canada, and the United States, and Allied civilians were interned in camps in Indonesia (the then Dutch East Indies), Hong Kong and the
Philippines.1 During the course of the war, the Allied and Axis powers undertook a small number of civilian exchanges which enabled the repatriation of
civilians. In each case, civilians were exchanged for civilians, often on a one-for-one basis. This contrasts with post-1945 exchanges which sometimes
involve the exchange of civilians for combatants (e.g. exchanges between Israel and Syria and Egypt in the 1960s and Iran and Syria in 2013) and frequently
on a basis other than a one-to-one exchange.
In September 1942, the first of what was hoped to be a series of exchanges of Japanese and British civilian citizens was held in Lourenco Marques in
Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique). Officially known as the “Anglo-Japan Civilian Exchange”, the exchange involved the repatriation of around 1,800
Japanese citizens resident across the British Empire, including Australia, India and Singapore and a similar number of British citizens who were in territory
under Japanese control. Shortly after this exchange was completed, negotiations for a second exchange began. However, due to a combination of
stubbornness by the Australian, British and Japanese governments and differences in the interpretation of what classified persons as merchant seamen, the
second exchange never eventuated. At the heart of the failure of the negotiations were 331 boat pilots and pearl divers who had worked in the pearling
industry until they were interned in Australia upon the outbreak of hostilities. These men were nominated by the Japanese government to be repatriated as
part of the exchange but the Australian government insisted that they were merchant seamen and therefore considered prisoners of war and so ineligible to be
included in a civilian exchange.
This paper looks at the negotiations between the United Kingdom - as the chief negotiator of the exchange - Australia and Japan over Australia’s decision to
classify the boat pilots and pearl divers as merchant seamen and the consequences of that decision. It shows that Australia’s position was initially supported
– if not encouraged - by the British government though London later pressured Australia to change its mind when the Japanese government nominated the
men to be included in the exchange and refused to participate unless they were included. The Australian government’s position was steadfastly supported by
General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific Area, and it was only after he withdrew his opposition to the repatriation of the men that
Australia agreed to allow them to be repatriated. By that time however, Japan no longer had the shipping available to carry out the exchange and consequently
it did not go ahead. The failure of the exchange meant that 1,600 Allied civilians interned in Japan and Hong Kong among other places remained in detention
until at least August 1945 as did a similar number of Japanese residents across the British Empire.
Whilst there have been a number of studies into the internment of enemy civilians in Australia during World War II, including that of Japanese civilians,2 no
research to date has specifically considered Australia’s role in the negotiation of the Anglo-Japanese civilian exchanges. In fact, the Anglo-Japanese civilian
exchanges have virtually escaped attention from any researchers. The one major exception is Kent Fedorowich who comprehensively analysed the failed
exchange in terms of the competing national self-interests of the British and Dominion governments as well as the different positions of the War, Colonial,
Dominion and Foreign Offices.3 Jonathan Vance also highlights national self-interest in his analysis of Canada’s changing position during the negotiations for
both prisoner of war and civilian exchanges.4 In contrast, research on the American-Japanese exchanges includes monographs by Scott Corbett5 and Bruce
Elleman.6 In keeping with the paucity of research on the Anglo-Japanese exchanges, to date no research has been undertaken specifically on the impact of
the definition of merchant seamen on the failure of the second exchange. Fedorowich, who refers to the second exchange as “doomed from the outset”
acknowledges the role of the boat pilots and pearl divers but does not consider the specifics of the issue.7 Corbett also acknowledges their role but only in
terms of the failure of the third American-Japanese exchange.8 In contrast to these studies, this paper focuses specifically on the definition of a merchant
seaman and the consequences that it had for the failed exchange. The analysis shows that whilst Japan was responsible for the conditions in the camps, the
failure of the exchange was partly due to the British and Australian governments’ inability to recognise each other’s position. In order to show how the
negotiations for the second exchange progressed, stalled and subsequently failed due to a change in the status of the boat pilots and pearl divers from
civilians to merchant seamen, the analysis is undertaken chronologically. The analysis is based on archival material held in the United Kingdom and Australia.
Importantly, in order to focus on the definition of merchant seamen and its impact on the second exchange, this paper does not question the humanitarian
motive of the British government. Nevertheless, it is clear that national self-interests of all and a lack of understanding of the Australian position by the United
Kingdom played a part in the failure of the exchange.
Internment of Japanese in Australia
On 8 December 1941, the police and representatives of the Australian Army began detaining Australia’s small number of Japanese residents. In total, more
than 1,100 local Japanese were detained and interned. Unlike the internment of people of other enemy nationalities, the War Cabinet decided in May 1941 that
both female and male Japanese would be detained and interned in event of war with Japan. Section 20 of the National Security (Aliens Control) Act of 19399
excluded the internment of men over 60 years and women but the War Cabinet decision was that “all Japanese males over 16 years” and “all Japanese
women” would be interned.10 The War Cabinet adopted the more comprehensive internment policy due to a lack of Japanese organisations that might indicate
members’ political leanings; a belief that Japanese people’s ‘strong national sentiment would probably lead to attempts at sabotage’ and concerns that if they
were free they ‘would probably be the object of demonstrations’.11 Whilst a subsequent decision saw Japanese males 60 years and over excluded because
they were “considered to be harmless”,12 the internment of Japanese nationals remained more comprehensive than Section 20 of the National Security (Aliens
Control) Act had permitted. Some of the Japanese individuals detained by the authorities were business people and their families, including some who were
Australian born.13 The majority though were crews – pilots, divers and luggers – of pearling and fishing vessels that operated in the waters to Australia’s
north. All Japanese were initially detained as civilians and held in civilian internment camps in locations such as Loveday, South Australia and Tatura, Victoria.
Throughout the war, responsibility for both civilian internment and prisoner of war camps lay with the Army. Initially, the Army was responsible for all civil
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Crew of the Sedney, a pearling lugger operating off Thursday Island, off the coast of the Cape York
Peninsula, Far North Queensland, Australia, 1936. The captain and most of the crew were likely from Ukui
in Wakayama Prefecture, Japan. John Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland Neg: 204317.
security matters but in July 1942, the Security Service was made responsible, among other matters, for the apprehension and release of local internees.14
In addition to the locally detained Japanese, civilian internment camps also came to hold Japanese who had been captured by the Dutch in the Dutch East
Indies and the British and Free French governments in their colonies across the South Pacific. As the interning power, these governments had residual control
over the administration of the civilian internees they had detained. This meant that the interning powers, and not Australia where the Japanese were interned,
decided whether or not the internees could be repatriated.15
Civilian Exchanges
Whilst the Geneva Convention of 1929 set out the terms for the detention and exchange of prisoners of war, it did not include any reference to the exchange
of civilians.16 Nevertheless, within days of the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Japanese government – which was not a signatory to the Convention – gave in-
principle support to a request from the United States government for an exchange of non-officials or civilians.17 Reciprocity in funding, the right of each state
to nominate those to be repatriated, and the voluntary participation of the repatriates became the centrepieces of the agreement.18 Shortly after the Japanese
government agreed to the United States’ proposal, it also agreed to a similar request from the British government. This latter agreement covered Britain, its
colonies, India and the Dominions. Britain advised the Australian government of its hopes for a ‘mutual scheme for repatriation’ of civilians in late December
1941.19 The terms of the Anglo-Japanese exchange agreement were based on those of the American-Japanese agreement. The United States and Japan
successfully negotiated two civilian exchanges but plans for a third were thwarted by the failure of the negotiations for the second Anglo-Japanese exchange.
The first United States-Japan exchange was held in Lourenço Marques in Portuguese East Africa in July 1942 and the second in Goa, then also a Portuguese
colony, in September 1943.
The first – and what became the only – Anglo-Japanese civilian exchange was held at Lourenço Marques in September 1942. On this occasion, around 1,800
Japanese were exchanged for a similar number of Allied government officials and civilians.20 Among those exchanged were 833 Japanese officials and
civilians, including men, women and children, transferred from Australia.21 The overwhelming majority of the repatriates from Australia had been interned in
Australia on behalf of other governments.
As noted above, the notion of reciprocity was central to the negotiations for both the United States-Japan and Anglo-Japanese exchanges. Initially, the
Americans considered reciprocity only in terms of the funding of the exchange but over time, reciprocity came to mean the exchange of an equal number of
civilian repatriates from both sides.22 Consequently, an exact number of internees from both sides needed to be identified and each potential repatriate had to
be interviewed to ascertain their interest in participating. In the case of the United States where there was a substantial population of Japanese residents,
balancing reciprocity in numbers from among those nominated by the Japanese government for repatriation and those willing to be repatriated proved
cumbersome.23 In the case of the Anglo-Japanese exchange, the terms were even more problematic as few Japanese were interned in Britain proper with
most held in Canada, India or Australia.24 This made Britain highly dependent on the co-operation of India, the Dominions and its colonies to attain the equity
in numbers.
Under the exchange agreement, each government would nominate the participants in an exchange. This rather innocuous point became one of the primary
causes of the failure of the negotiations for the second exchange as it was Japan’s nomination of the 331 pilots and pearl divers who Australia would not allow
to be included in the exchange that caused the stalemate. Importantly, whilst the participating Allied governments allowed the Japanese government to
nominate all the civilians to be repatriated, they were happy for representatives of the Swiss Government – as the Protecting Power for the interests of Great
Britain – to select, over and above the initial nominees from each of the Allied participants, the remainder of those to be repatriated. This was presumably to
prevent disagreements among the Allies over the precise national make-up of the repatriates.
The Hague Convention and the status of Merchant Seamen
Whilst the Geneva Convention of 1929 established the terms for the protection of prisoners of war, its lack of references to civilians, or more specifically the
status of merchant seamen, meant that the ‘Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War’
otherwise known as ‘The Hague Convention XI’ of 1907 (hereafter ‘Hague Convention’) still stood. There were three main differences in the application of the
two conventions. First, whilst the Hague Convention did not require the names of captive enemy merchant seamen to be notified to their government, the
Geneva Convention of course failed to address civilians, or merchant seamen at all. It did require notification of names of prisoners of war as one of its main
terms. The second major difference was that the Geneva Convention prohibited the employment of prisoners of war in war related operations and allowed for
them to be paid for any work undertaken. Britain considered these terms to be ‘privileges’ and whilst it treated merchant seamen as much as possible
according to the terms of the Geneva Convention, it saw the application of all provisions to be impractical.25 Issues of pay and working hours were not
addressed in the Hague Convention.
The third difference, and our main concern here, was that the Hague Convention allowed for merchant seamen, under certain conditions, to be held as
civilians. Article 6 of the Hague Convention reads “[t]he captain, officers, and members of the crew, when nationals of the enemy State, are not made
prisoners of war, on condition that they make a formal promise in writing, not to undertake while hostilities last, any service connected with the operations of
the war”.26 Depending on whether the merchant seamen signed such an undertaking, they could be released, interned as civilians or held as prisoners of war.
When held as civilians, the merchant seamen could only be repatriated as part of a civilian exchange but if interned as prisoners of war, they could only be
repatriated as members of a prisoners of war exchange. It was the policy of all British Commonwealth governments that no merchant seamen be given the
opportunity to sign such an undertaking.27
Although the Hague Convention was signed prior to the outbreak of World War I, it was largely ignored during that conflict and the belligerents usually held
merchant seamen as prisoners of war. During World War II, the status of merchant seamen was more varied with reciprocity in the terms of internment
playing an important role. Initially, Britain held enemy merchant seamen as civilians partly because it did not consider the Hague Convention to be “binding
upon them”28 but changed its policies as issues surrounding reciprocity came into play. As Moore explains, central to the British government’s concerns were
difficulties in assessing comparable terms of internment, including pay rates and the number of working hours per week.29 For the sake of uniformity, the
Australian government adopted the same policy as the British government.
However, it was not always clear who should be considered a merchant seaman. In an attempt to clarify this point, in August 1941 the British Imperial
Prisoners of War Committee decided that an enemy merchant seamen would be defined as:
An enemy national who, at the time of his capture, either is a member of the crew of any ship or is proceeding abroad in accordance with
an agreement to join in service in any ships or who has been at any time since 1 September 1939, a member of any ship. In the above
context ‘ship’ should include a ship employed in sea-fighting or the sea-fishing service, a pilotage, a lighthouse tender, a light vessel tender
or a light vessel.30
A “member of crew” was further described as “a person who has been employed or engaged as a member of the crew of a ship in any capacity, and includes
a person employed or engaged as a Master, Pilot or Apprentice”.31 The definition of merchant seamen therefore covered all enemy nationals employed on
vessels of any size. Yet, the definition was not without its problems as is indicated by the following ‘Intergovernmental Committee on Prisoners of War’
explanation, also written in August 1941, of the distinction between merchant seamen held as civilians and those held as prisoners of war.32 According to the
Committee:
crews of enemy merchant seamen detained by Civil authorities in British or Allied ports are treated as civilian internees. German and
Italians captured on the high seas or in a hostile port when acting as a members of the crew of an enemy merchant ship are classified as
merchant seamen and treated as far as possible as prisoners of war. It is also recognised by the Protecting Power that the crew of a
German or Italian merchant vessel captured on the high seas shall be treated as merchant seamen whatever their vocations in civilian life
may be.33
This distinction makes clear that merchant seamen detained by civil authorities are civilians whilst those detained by non-civil authorities (e.g. the Navy) are
Prisoners of War. Importantly, only this explanation of the distinction between civilians and prisoners of war makes any reference to ’an enemy merchant
ship’. Under Australian law, all luggers had to be registered to Australians and therefore most of the Japanese working in the pearl industry, at least on paper,
worked on local ships rather than ‘enemy ships’.34 That is, the Japanese pilots and pearl divers did not work on ‘enemy ships’. According to the above
definitions, all merchant seamen detained in Australian ports should have been – and in fact were – interned as civilians. These definitions were in effect at
the time of Japan’s entry into the war.
On 5 December 1941, Dominion Affairs notified the Australian Prime Minister’s Department that in event of war, Hungarian, Finn and Romanian merchant
seamen were to be automatically interned.35 Just over three weeks later, this advice was extended to Japanese merchant seamen.36 Two months later,
Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London, advised the Australian Prime Minister’s Department that the status of all enemy merchant
seamen who had been interned as civilians was to be changed to prisoners of war.37 In line with this notification, Australia changed the status of Axis power
merchant seamen, including Finns and Bulgarians, to prisoners of war. At this point, the War Office in London expressly stated that the change of status did
not apply to German merchant seamen, as reciprocity had not been received. Just over a month later, the status of German merchant seamen was also
changed to prisoners of war, although the terms relating to pay for work were specifically excluded.38 The change in the status of German merchant seamen
was explained as being “in conformity with the treatment of British seamen in German hands”.39 A few months later, Bruce notified the Australian Government
that Germany and Britain had agreed to terms and German merchant seamen would now be considered to be prisoners of war. 40 In the same cable, Bruce
also expressly stated that Japanese merchant seamen were excluded for reciprocity reasons. That is, in May 1942 the status of the Japanese pilots and
Sedney pearling lugger returning to Thursday Island, 1936. John Oxley Library, State Library of
Queensland. Neg: 204312.
pearl divers was clearly stated to be that of civilians and they therefore remained interned as such.
On 2 January 1943, Bruce advised the Army that the United Kingdom had now decided that Japanese merchant seamen should also be treated as prisoners
of war.41 It is unclear what led to this change in policy and the Dominions Office itself noted later that the reasons behind the decision were not clear.42 In
response to the notification of the change in policy, the Australian Prime Minister’s Department requested clarification as to whether the “372 Japanese
previously engaged pearling industry around the Australian coast” should be classified as prisoners of war.43 This clarification was sought due to the Army’s
concerns that the Japanese merchant seamen could come into contact with Japanese prisoners of war captured in New Guinea and might be able to take
vital information back to Japan if they were repatriated. The War Office’s decision was that “crews of Japanese ships employed in fishing at date of Japan’s
entry into war should be regarded as prisoners of war”.44 It also confirmed that the men would “not be eligible for repatriation”.45 As Fedorowich notes, this
“seemingly innocuous request for clarification” had severe consequences for the negotiations of the second civilian exchange.46 Following receipt of
clarification from London, the Army advised the Department of General Security that it is “proposed to alter the status of all Japanese known to have been
members of crews of luggers. At an early date such persons will be classified as PW (merchant seamen) and not as internees.”47 The status of all Japanese
men employed in the pearling and fishing industries at the time of their capture was subsequently changed from civilian to merchant seamen and therefore
prisoner of war. Shortly after this change was enacted, the Australian government sought, and was provided with confirmation that enemy governments,
including the Japanese government, had been advised of the change.48
The change in the status of the pilots and pearl divers saw them moved from civilian internment camps to prisoner of war camps, such as that in Hay, New
South Wales. As prisoners of war the men could be interrogated and accordingly interrogations were held in September 1943.49 As a result of the
interrogations and associated investigations, the status of four prisoners of war was changed back to civilian internee as it was found that they were not
involved in offshore work and therefore could not be considered to be merchant seamen. The status of Shiwoda Gisaku for instance, was changed back to
civilian internee when he was found to be a gardener and fisherman living in the Mossman River area who had not been employed on a seafaring vessel.50
Similarly, Tabata Naoyomu, an internee captured on Thursday Island had his status reverted to civilian internee after he was identified as a carpenter and not
involved in the fishing industry.51 Tabata was on the Japanese government’s nominated list for the second exchange and his change of status therefore made
him eligible for repatriation.
Negotiating the Second Anglo-Japanese Civilian Exchange
The original plan was that negotiations for the second Anglo-Japanese exchange would begin immediately the ships from the first exchange were at sea.
However, to quote one of the negotiators in the British Foreign Office, “the atmosphere is still rather highly charged … and I think there should be a few
weeks breather to allow everybody to cool down”.52 Despite this view, the Dominions Office wrote to the Dominions the very next day advising them that it
was time to commence negotiations for another exchange.53 Australia’s response to this approach gives an indication of how tense the negotiations for the
first exchange had become. The Australian government’s reply was that it considered the exchange to have been ‘overwhelmingly in Japan’s favour’ and in
light of the difference in the number of Australians repatriated (31) compared to the number of Japanese Australia had released (63), it would place some
restrictions on Australia’s participation in any further exchanges.54 The British Government’s response was that reciprocity in numbers applied to all British
citizens and not just to the residents of individual countries.55 Understandably this response did not impress the Australian Government. Despite Australia’s
negativity, the Dominions Office had no choice but to continue negotiations with the Australian government as it considered the Japanese held in Australia to
be more valuable to the Japanese government than those held elsewhere.56 The higher value of the Japanese in Australia was presumably due to a belief that
many of the more valuable people held elsewhere had been repatriated in the first exchange.
Due to Australia’s stance, it was December 1942 before the British government felt confident enough to approach the various Allied governments about the
possibility of starting negotiations for the second exchange. The Japanese government was also approached about its interest and gave its in-principle
support. The British government’s plan was that the exchange would take place in July 1943. It agreed with the Japanese government’s proposal that the
exchange take place in Goa. From the outset, the British Foreign Office portrayed the exchange as a humanitarian exercise with an emphasis on the
repatriation of the sick and elderly and civilian women and children interned in Hong Kong.57 The exchange ships were also to be used to transport relief
supplies, including food and medicines, to British and American prisoners of war in the region.58
The negotiations on the precise terms of the exchange among the British, India, the Dominions and the various participating Allied governments were complex
and time consuming but by June 1943 - only weeks before what had been the planned date for the exchange - all governments had agreed to terms, although
Australia’s participation was subject to some restrictions. Australia’s chief restriction was that Quinn, Bowden and Wooton (sic), Australian officials excluded
from the original exchange, be included.59 The Japanese government was notified of the Allies’ terms and Australia’s restrictions on the same day, but in
separate telegrams.60
In late July 1943, the Australian government received a copy of the Japanese government’s nominated list of people to be included in the exchange. Of the
nominees, 322 (later revised upwards to 33161 were found to be boat pilots and pearl divers formerly employed in the pearling industry and now held as
prisoners of war. The Australian government replied that as prisoners of war are ineligible for repatriation, the Japanese government be asked to nominate
other people to replace the pilots and pearl divers.62 The Japanese government refused on the basis that the nominated men had been “domiciled in Australia
and nearby territories before the war” and none of the nominees were sailors or merchant seamen.63 The Japanese government also suggested that under the
circumstances, Article 3 of the Hague Convention should apply. The Australia and Britain governments agreed that domicile had no bearing on whether a
person was a merchant seaman or not and that this argument had no validity. Both governments also agreed that the Hague Convention did not apply albeit
for different reasons and motivations. The British government was not convinced that the pilots and pearl divers had been “members of crews” and was
therefore hesitant to use the term.64 It also wanted to avoid any reference to the Hague Convention in the reply as it was concerned that it may lead to the
Japanese government arguing that the pilots and pearl divers should have been released immediately after being given the opportunity to sign the undertaking
provided for in the convention.65 As noted above, it was Commonwealth policy not to provide merchant seamen with such an opportunity. According to the
Australian government, as Articles 5 to 7 of the Hague Convention applied only to “crews of enemy merchant ships” and the Japanese had been employed on
vessels registered in Australia, Article 6 did not apply. 66 Furthermore, Australia argued that since the men had been ‘habitually’ involved in their vocation as
seamen, it could legitimately consider them to be merchant seamen.67 Article 3 reads that “vessels used exclusively for fishing along the coast or small boats
employed in local trade are exempt from capture”.68 Whilst the basis for the Japanese government’s argument that Article 3 should apply is not clear, it is
presumably based on the notion that vessels used in the pearling and fishing industries were small and therefore crew members should be exempt from
internment. Whilst there is some validity to the Japanese argument, the Australian response was that “[b]y no topographical stretch can the provisions of
Article 3 be made to apply to the case of Japanese seamen who earn their livelihood by serving on vessels operating in or near Australian territorial waters”.69
That is, the Australian government believed that as the pilots and pearl divers’ work saw them working in and around Australia’s northern waters and their
work did not involve them visiting in Japan, then their work could not be considered ‘local’, and therefore Article 3 could not apply. The Hague Convention did
not define the meaning of ‘local’ so Australia’s definition is questionable.
In early October 1943, in a long cable to Prime Minister Curtin which appears to have been sent on the encouragement of the British, High Commissioner
Bruce wrote that there was a strong feeling in the Prisoners of War Department that the negotiations for the exchange were at risk of completely breaking
down. The consequences of such a situation, Bruce noted, would be the loss of a means to transport supplies to Allied prisoners of war and would “condemn
1,600 civilians including women and children and sick to indefinite incarceration under gradually worsening conditions”.70 That is, he emphasised the
humanitarian impact of the failure of the negotiations. Bruce also urged the Australian government to allow the repatriation of the Japanese merchant seamen,
noting that among the people nominated by the Allies to be included in the exchange were 44 merchant seamen whose repatriation the Japanese government
had made no attempt to prevent.71 In a strongly worded retort, the Australian Government advised Bruce that its exclusion of the merchant seamen was
primarily on security grounds and that the Army and Military Intelligence were “emphatic that these men should on no account be released”.72 Australia also
referred to correspondence it had received from MacArthur who described the situation as “a typical example of conflicting claims of local as compared to
general interests” and his advice that the Australian government not “yield” to the pressures to allow the men to be repatriated.73 Interestingly, in his reply
Bruce wrote that he had been unaware of the security implications of the situation.74 The Australian Government had obviously not communicated the
complete story to its representative in London.
In November, the British representatives in Switzerland advised the British Foreign Office that Japanese representatives had unofficially raised the issue of it
having “never agreed that merchant seamen should be regarded as prisoners of war”.75 That is, the Japanese government had never agreed to reciprocity in
terms of merchant seamen and therefore there was no reason for Britain to have changed the status of any Japanese merchant seamen to prisoners of war.
As noted earlier, the justification for this change in policy is unclear. There is no record of the Berne Legation’s message being sent to Australia, and the
Prisoners of War Office admitted in a letter that its decision to change the status of the Japanese merchant seamen had been a unilateral one.76
Negotiations between the Australian and British governments over how to reply to the Japanese government continued through to early December 1943 when
a compromise wording of a reply appears to have been agreed to and sent by the Office of Dominion Affairs to the Swiss Legation. Whilst no copy of this
cable has been found, it presumably outlined the reasons why the Hague Convention did not apply.77 In a cable to the Australian Government in late
December, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London notes that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had suggested that communication
regarding the exchange be halted as the exchange probably would not occur.78
Over the ensuing months, Britain periodically pressured the Australian government to change its mind about the exclusion of the pilots and pearl divers,
usually by emphasising the humanitarian nature of the exchange. For example, in a major attempt to break the impasse, in March 1944 the British War
Cabinet endorsed a proposal to offer the Japanese government an exchange of 1,270 persons (1,600 minus 330 merchant seamen and later revised to
1,699).79 The Japanese government replied that it was unable to accept the new proposal.80
The Involvement of the United States
In late 1943, the United States government began pressuring the British government over the progress of the exchange negotiations. The involvement of the
United States was driven by the Japanese government’s refusal to proceed with the proposed third American-Japanese exchange until negotiations for the
second Anglo-Japanese exchange had been finalised.81 In early 1944, after discussions between the British Embassy in Washington and the United States’
State Department, the Special Division whose job it was to organise the American exchanges, sought to have MacArthur change his views so that the second
Anglo-Japanese exchange could proceed. However, MacArthur stood firm and refused to change his recommendation. According to Corbett, one explanation
for MacArthur’s refusal to budge was that many of the prisoners of war held captive by the Japanese were his own men and this direct involvement overrode
his “military judgement”.82 In mid-1944, with the negotiations still gridlocked and information coming out of Hong Kong, China and Japan indicating worsening
conditions, President Roosevelt became involved. In a personal communication to Churchill, Roosevelt suggested that he would recommend that the
repatriation of the pilots and divers go ahead if Churchill could intervene in a problem that United States officials in Argentina were experiencing.83 Churchill’s
response sent later the same day noted that the pilots and divers were held in Australia and he had sent a copy of the President’s correspondence to
Curtin.84
It is unclear what followed, but it appears that Roosevelt requested his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Sutherland, discuss the matter directly with
MacArthur. Subsequently, MacArthur wrote in a cable that his opposition to the repatriation of the pilots and pearl divers had been based “entirely [on] military
grounds … [but] … Higher Governmental authority might feel that there were other considerations which outweighed his views”.85 Whilst MacArthur did not
specifically withdraw his opposition to the repatriation of the pilots and pearl divers, his more nuanced announcement allowed others to ignore his earlier
recommendation. On learning of the outcome of the Sutherland-MacArthur discussions, the Australian War Cabinet agreed to withdraw its refusal to allow the
men to be included in the exchange.86 In the interim, however, the war situation had changed quite substantially. When advised that the exchange could now
proceed, the Japanese government advised that, as it had warned in late 1943 might happen, it no longer had access to the ships required to undertake the
exchange. Whilst the British and United States governments jointly continued to negotiate for an exchange up until as late as June 1945 – including the
possibility of an exchange of prisoners of war – the second Anglo-Japanese civilian exchange never eventuated. This was despite attempts in 1944 and 1945
by the American and British governments to organise an exchange using crew members from among the Japanese internees held in camps in the United
States, Canada and Australia. In this instance, Australia was criticised by the United States for not being able to supply any merchant seamen to crew the
ships, when it had been Australia’s argument that the pearl divers and pilots were merchant seamen properly classified as prisoners of war that had led to the
stalemate in negotiations for the second exchange.87
The boat pilots and pearl divers not only continued to be interned throughout the war but also after the end of hostilities with most Japanese internees not
repatriated until at least 1946. In most cases, irrespective of their own personal wishes and how long they had lived in Australia prior to the outbreak of war,
most of the Japanese were repatriated to Japan.88
In reality, even if the 331 Japanese boat pilots and pearl divers had been repatriated to Japan as early as mid-1943 as had been the original plan, their
knowledge of Australian waters would probably not have been of any significant value. This is not to discount, however, that as the Australian government
pointed out, all the Japanese government nominees were of military age and it was in this regard that they were potentially of value to Japan.89 It is hard to
judge whether Australia’s view, that as merchant seamen the pilots and pearl divers should be considered prisoners of war and therefore excluded from the
exchange, resulted in the deaths of Allied civilians who could have been repatriated. However, it is probably safe to conclude that many of them would have
preferred to have been repatriated to relative freedom than endure the conditions in the internment camps.
Merchant Seamen are not Civilians
In short, the lack of agreement in what constituted who was a merchant seamen combined with the United Kingdom’s decision to unilaterally decide that all
Japanese merchant seamen should be interned as prisoners of war, saw the negotiations for a second Anglo-Japanese civilian exchange collapse. The failure
of the negotiations had implications far beyond the 331 Japanese pilots and pearl divers at the centre of the negotiations as the collapse of the negotiations
not only prevented the repatriation of over 3000 Japanese and Allied civilians who would have been participants in the exchange but also those who would
been repatriated under the third United States-Japanese exchange.
This paper has shown that the change in the status of Japanese boat pilots and pearl divers interned in Australia from civilian internee to prisoners of war was
undertaken in accordance with British policies. Moreover, the change was at the heart of the failure of the negotiations for a second Anglo-Japanese civilian
exchange. Australia contended, in accordance with the instructions it received from the United Kingdom, that the boat pilots and pearl divers were merchant
seamen and therefore could legitimately be excluded from a civilian exchange. The Japanese government on the other hand, refused to participate in the
exchange unless the men were included. Whilst it is not clear what the real value to Japan of the boat pilots and pearl divers would have been, it is possible
that as the Australian government suggested, it was their age rather than their skills and knowledge that would have made them valuable. The stalemate that
resulted not only saw the direct involvement of President Roosevelt in the matter but ensured that the exchange never eventuated. Civilian internees on both
sides suffered the consequences of the failed negotiations. The consequences of the failure of the negotiations were felt most keenly by civilians held in
internment camps on both sides who would have been repatriated should the negotiations have succeeded. The subsequent adoption of the Geneva
Convention of 1949 which has given greater recognition to the rights of civilians and removed the discrepancies between what constitutes a merchant seaman
versus a civilian makes it less likely that a similar definitional problem will occur.
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